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Shayak Sarkart
Recent debates over microfinance regulatory frameworks have
misunderstood an important instrument: repayment frequency. Despite recent
laws mandating lower microfinance repayment frequency under the banner of
consumer protection, this Comment argues that repayment frequency is unable
to protect borrowers beyond what substantive anti-coercion rights and
procedural law can, and have begun to, accomplish. Moreover, repayment
frequency, because of its link to meetings in group lending schemes, can
produce social capital among borrowers, a byproduct that has been ignored in
regulatory debates. By using a more holistic framework to measure financial
regulation's effects, this Comment recommends reconsidering laws forbidding
weekly repayment.
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Introduction
The "miracle" of microfinance has lost much of its luster.' Highly
publicized suicides, regulatory crackdowns, popular anti-lender movements,
and mass defaults unsettled the industry in India a few years ago. 2 Mohammad
t The author thanks Christine Jolls, Joshua Rosenthal, and Christine Tsang for their
comments throughout the writing process, Matthew Halgren for his thoughtful editorial feedback, and
Erica Field and Rohini Pande for the initial introduction to experimental microfinance research.
1. Esther Duflo et al., The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized
Evaluation 34 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18950, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8950.pdf ("Microcredit therefore may not be the 'miracle' that it is
sometimes claimed to be. . . .").
2. Lydia Polgreen & Vikas Bajaj, India Microcredit Faces Collapse from Defaults,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l1/18/world/asial8micro.html ("[S]ome
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Yunus, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for founding the seminal microfinance
organization known as the Grameen Bank, attributed the microfinance crisis to
commercialization, particularly for-profit "loan sharks," and lent his support to
stricter government regulation.3 Amidst recent regulatory battles in India,
Yunus, in April 2013, reiterated his position that microfinance must renew its
focus on people.4
This Comment addresses how the law of microfinance can do just that by
building social capital through an overlooked legal lever: repayment frequency.
Given the global growth in laws and regulations addressing microfinance,5
understanding this lever's potential to advance various goals can help in
optimally regulating this significant segment of the international financial
landscape. Despite recent provisions mandating lower repayment frequency
under the banner of consumer protection, I argue that repayment frequency is
unable to protect borrowers beyond what substantive anti-coercion rights and
procedural laws can, and have begun to, accomplish. Rather, increased
repayment frequency has the unique potential to build social capital.
In Part I, I introduce the law of microfinance. In Part II, I introduce
repayment frequency and argue that recent experimental studies refute claims
that repayment frequency affects short-term financial outcomes such as
entrepreneurial investment and default.
In Part III, I establish the connection between repayment frequency and
social capital. Since repayments are made in the context of group meetings,
higher frequency repayment facilitates greater social interaction and risk-
sharing, of particular importance in risk-laden emerging economies. In Part IV,
I then argue that alternative regulatory instruments in recent microfinance laws
increase consumer protection in a way that lower repayment frequency cannot.
Indian officials fear that microfinance could become India's version of the United States' subprime
mortgage debacle."); see also RBI Submits Affidavit on AP Microfinance Law Jurisdiction, HINDU Bus.
LINE, July 29, 2012, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/banking/rbi-submits
-affidavit-on-ap-microfinance-law-jurisdiction/article3699615.ece (noting that regulation passed "in the
wake of a spate of suicides by the borrowers allegedly due to the coercive recovery practices by the MFI
agents").
3. Muhammad Yunus, Op-Ed., Sacriicing Microcredit for Megaprofits, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/opinion/I 5yunus.html.
4. David Bornstein, Beyond Profit: A Talk with Muhammad Yunus, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (Apr. 17, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/beyond
-profit-a-talk-with-muhammad-yunus ("I dismiss personal profit, and focus exclusively on people and
planet.").
5. See, e.g., Thankom Arun & Victor Murinde, Microfinance Regulation and Social
Protection, EUROPEAN UNIV. INST. (2010), http://erd.eui.eu/media/2010/Arun-Murinde.pdf (detailing
emerging microfmance regulation in Africa); Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for
Microfinance Banks in Nigeria, CENT. BANK OF NIGERIA (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2013/CCD/Amended%20Regulatory%20and%20Supervisory/20Guidelin
es%20for 0/o20MFB.pdf; Russian Federation - Microfinance Development Project, THE WORLD BANK
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17167625/russian-federation-micr





In Part V, I recommend a reconsideration of laws forbidding installments
due as frequently as once per week.
I. The Law of Microfinance
While definitions of microfinance vary, it is generally thought to include
not only lending, or microcredit, but savings schemes and insurance products as
6
well. Microfinance products traditionally are of low monetary value, intended
to encourage entrepreneurial activity, and targeted at poor women. I focus on
group microcredit, which involves making one collateral-free loan to a group of
people who are all responsible for its repayment. This group lending, which is
microfinance's most recognized subsector, purportedly provides a liability
structure when the lack of individual collateral makes traditional, non-group
lending infeasible.7  The classic group microcredit model created and
disseminated by the Grameen Bank involves jointly liable "solidarity groups"
of five people.8 The Grameen model also requires that installments be paid
weekly, setting a periodicity standard for the field.9
As microfinance has grown, so have the legal structures in which it
operates. West African countries developed a multinational framework to
regulate microfinance.' 0 Individual countries, including the Kyrgyz Republic,1
have passed legislation exclusively addressing microfinance, while Bolivial2
and others regulate microfinance under preexisting banking law.13 Countries
may vest regulatory power over microfinance in a supervising authority, often
6. Dean Karlan & Nathaniel Goldberg, Impact Evaluation of Microfinance, THE
WORLD BANK 3 (2007), http://karlan.yale.edu/p/Doingieseries-07.pdf.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Namrata Acharya, Microfinance Institutions Drift from Traditional Grameen
Lending Model, BUS. STANDARD, Jan. 2, 2013, http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance
/microfinance-institutions-drift-from-traditional-grameen-lending-model-1130102000321 .html ("The
Grameen model, dating back to 1976, stipulates weekly repayments under group lending. . . .").
10. The 1994 Projet d'Appui A la Rdglementation sur les Mutuelles d'tpargne et de
Cr6dit (PARMEC) law regulates licensed microfinance institutions in the UMOA region, comprising
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Korotoumou
Ouattara, Microfinance Regulation in Benin: Implications of the PARMEC Law for Development and
Performance of the Industry 16 (The World Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series, Paper No. 50,
2003), http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp50.pdf.
11. Ctr. for Fin., Law & Policy, The Kyrgyz Republic Law on Micro-finance
Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic, BOS. UNIV. (2002), http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012
/01/Law-No.- 1 24-on-Microfinance-Organizations-in-the-Kyrgyz-Republic-English.pdf
12. La Regulacidn y Supervisidn de las Entidades Microfinancieras en Bolivia [The
Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions in Bolivia], AUTORIDAD DE SUPERVISION DEL
SISTEMA FINANCIERO, http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/0 I/Regulation-and-Supervision-of
-Microfinance-Institutions-in-Bolivia.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
13. Regulatory Requirements for Microfinance, DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FOR
TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT GMBH 2 (2003), http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/08/Regulatory
-Requirements-for-Microfinance.pdf ("The legal system for microfinance may be specified in a law
catering exclusively or foremost for MFIs (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras,
Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, Uganda) [or] in a decree or regulations under the Banking Law
(Bolivia, Indonesia). . . .").
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the central bank,14 though some governments retain the authority to approve or
reject central bank rules.' 5  Subnational jurisdictions have also regulated
microfinance, as in the recent and controversial microfinance law passed in the
state of Andhra Pradesh, India.' 6
II. The Theory and Empirics of Repayment Frequency
While different countries have different repayment frequency norms,1
most microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh and India follow the
classic Grameen model of weekly repayment installments. Andhra Pradesh
rejected this schedule and mandated a minimum time interval of one month
between repayments.' 9 The national Micro Finance Institutions (Development
and Regulation) Bill, which was pending before the legislature as of September
2013, delegates authority to India's central bank to regulate the "periodicity of
repayment" but does not specify a standard.20
Behavioral economists argue that the weekly Grameen cycle illustrates
how frequent repayment can act as a commitment device and build "fiscal
discipline."21
Yet stringent terms may impose collateral costs on consumers: one report
suggested that the need to produce frequent repayment installments could
discourage long-term investments (which would not be expected immediately
to generate returns that could be used to repay the loan).22 The experimental
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 9 (In both Nepal and Pakistan, "rules made by the central bank must be
approved by the government.").
16. See Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending)
Ordinance, 2010 Andhra Pradesh Ordinances No. 9, http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Andhra
-Pradesh-Micro-Finance-Institutions-Ordinance.pdf.
17. Kirsten Weiss, The Microfinance Evolution Toward MSME Lending: Lessons from
Pakistan, SHOREBANK INT'L LTD. 3 (Feb. 2008), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document
-1.9.30942/The%20Microfinance%20Evolution%20Toward%20MSME%2OLending%20Lessons%20
from%20Pakistan.pdf (noting how group lending in Pakistan usually requires fortnightly or monthly
repayment).
I8. Erica Field & Rohini Pande, Repayment Frequency and Default in Microfinance:
Evidence from India, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 501, 502 (2008) (noting "the almost universal practice of
weekly repayment among MFIs").
19. ANDHRA PRADESH GAZETTE, Rules Supplement to Part VII Extraordinary No. 2,
The Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Rules (Oct. 19, 2010) r.
20(l)(a), http://gazette.ap.gov.in/gtPublicReport.aspx (search for rules promulgated on "19102010")
[hereinafter Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Rules].
20. The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, Lok Sabha 62,
15th L.S. § 25(I)(2)(c) (2012) (India), http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-micro-finance
-institutions-development-and-regulation-bill-2012-2348/ [hereinafter India Micro Finance Bill].
21. Sendhil Mullainathan & Sudha Krishnan, Psychology and Economics: What it
Means for Microfinance, INNOVATIONS FOR POVERTY ACTION 3 (2008),
http://scholar.harvard.edulfiles/mullainathan/files/psychologyand_economicswhatitmeans-for
microfinance.pdf ("[D]ecreas[ing] the frequency of repayments and group meetings ... will disrupt
fiscal discipline in borrowers.").
22. See Field & Pande, supra note 18, at 502.
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microfinance literature has documented how increased repayment frequency
increases self-reported financial stress.23
Repayment frequency laws are theoretically motivated by these consumer
protection concerns. In response to allegations of microfinance's dire outcomes
for borrowers, India's central bank commissioned a committee led by Yezdi
Hirji Malegam to produce a report (hereinafter, the Malegam report) studying
issues in the microfinance sector.24 The report recounted several theoretical
burdens purportedly imposed on borrowers by weekly repayment, including de
facto liquidity requirements that prevent illiquid entrepreneurial investment and
25possible repayment delinquency.
Empirical research testing these theories among borrowers in India does
not support these fears regarding the financial effects of frequent repayment.
First, recent experimental evidence demonstrates that initial grace periods
encourage illiquid, entrepreneurial investment choices even when repayment
frequency is held constant.26 Since traditional group lending models begin
repayment almost immediately after loan disbursal, a short grace period
between disbursal and the first installment's due date can improve both short-
term investment and long-term profits.27
At the same time, experimental evidence documents no effect of monthly
28
repayment on short-term default. The Malegam report echoed this growing
consensus that repayment frequency has insignificant effects on default rates.29
In the following Part, I therefore focus on what repayment frequency can
affect: social capital.
III. The Role of Social Capital
Robert Putnam famously defines social capital as "features of social
organization, such as trust, norms and networks" that can facilitate collective
action.30 Commentators often cite the centrality of trust, norms, and networks in
23. Erica Field et al., Repayment Flexibility Can Reduce Financial Stress: A
Randomized Control Trial with Microfinance Clients in India, 7 PUB. LIBR. SCI. ONE e45679 (2012),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjoumal.pone.0045679.
24. Y.H. Malegam et al., Report of the Sub-Committee of the Central Board of
Directors of Bank of India to Study Issues and Concerns in the MFI Sector (2011),
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in /rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/YHMR1901 11 .pdf
25. Id. at 8.
26. Erica Field et al., Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage
Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India, 103 AM. ECON. REv. 2196
(2013).
27. Id.
28. Field & Pande, supra note 18, at 501.
29. N. Srinivasan, Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report 36 (2010),
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document- 1.9.52504/State%20of%20the%20Sector%20
Report%202010.pdf.
30. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 167 (1993).
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facilitating group lending.31 However, the role of group microcredit in creating
social capital has, until recently, been largely neglected despite its importance.
The Grameen model brings together borrowers, usually women who are
neighbors but not "friends," in the repayment meetings.32 The meetings
facilitate both public repayment and general social interaction, a particularly
valuable experience given "traditional norms of female isolation" in India and
other large microfinance markets.33
These mandatory short-term interactions lead to increased voluntary long-
term interaction. An experimental study found that members of lending groups
(where each borrower nonetheless had an individual liability contract) assigned
to weekly repayment schedules ended up spending significantly more out-of-
meeting social time with other group members than did members of groups
assigned to pay in monthly installments.34 Members of the weekly groups
continued to socially interact at higher rates even after the loans were repaid.
Weekly members more successfully endured financial shocks, exhibited lower
long-term default rates in subsequent loan cycles (despite the fact that all
36clients had reverted to the same fortnightly repayment schedule), and were
more inclined to share risk with fellow group members.37 Since a lack of risk
sharing impedes individual advancement and economic growth in risk-laden
emerging economies, repayment meetings provide a promising way to promote
development.38
More broadly, trust and social networks, as dimensions of social capital,
are increasingly viewed as mechanisms for poverty alleviation, economic
growth, and social development.39  The microeconomics of repayment
31. Cf Xavier Gin6 & Dean S. Karlan, Group Versus Individual Liability: Short and
Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups 3, 26, 29 (Ctr. for Global Dev.,
Working Paper No. 111, 2011), http://karlan.yale.edu/p/GroupversusIndividualLending.pdf (finding
that, when borrowers select the members of their repayment groups (presumably from among people
already in their networks), group liability has little additional effect on mitigating moral hazard or
default).
32. Benjamin Feigenberg et al., The Economic Returns to Social Interaction:
Experimental Evidence from Microfinance, 80 REV. ECON. STUD. 1459, 1463 (2013).
33. Id. at 1476.
34. Id. at 1469-70.
35. Id. at 1469.
36. Id. at 1461 ("Those who met weekly during their first loan cycle were three times
(5.2 percentage points) less likely to default on their subsequent loan, despite the fact that all clients had
reverted to the same repayment schedule.").
37. Id. ("[G]reater social interaction among clients on a weekly schedule was
accompanied by increased willingness to pool risk relative to monthly clients.").
38. Arun Chandrasekhar, Cynthia Kinnan & Horacio Larreguy, Informal Insurance,
Social Networks, and Savings Access: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field, CONSORTIUM OF
FIN. SYS. & POVERTY 2 (2012), http://www.cfsp.org/sites/default/files/publications/chandrasekhar
.kinnan.larre.guy.2012.pdf ("Individuals in developing countries face large amounts of risk (weather,
health, prices, etc.). Interpersonal insurance can potentially play an important role in buffering this risk,
but evidence suggests that it is incomplete: not all idiosyncratic risk is insured.").






frequencies can therefore create positive macroeconomic consequences.
Despite concerns over how social capital might breed group-based corruption
and rent-seeking, retrospective empirical research provides no evidence that
such associational inefficiencies neutralize the positive effects of social
capital. 40  The experimental research on repayment periodicity thus
demonstrates how laws "tweaking the design of standard development
programs to encourage social interaction can generate economically valuable
social capital."4 1
IV. Effective Consumer Protection
Given the importance of frequent repayment for building social capital,
policymakers should find alternative avenues to address their legitimate
consumer protection concerns. Such protection is better accomplished through
direct anti-coercion regulatory tools, such as limits on employing collection
agents, efficient complaint procedures, and substantive civil and criminal
punishments to hold lenders accountable, as are used in the Andhra Pradesh
42 43 44
state rules, the Indian national bill, and beyond. Lowering repayment
frequency cannot accomplish anything approximating, much less anything
more than, these substantive and procedural laws can.
Procedurally, microfinance borrower rights must be enforced swiftly and
effectively, particularly since developing countries with large microfinance
sectors are unlikely to have transparent and efficient judiciaries. One key
innovation in Andhra Pradesh has been a free telephone line to file
administrative complaints, exploiting the ubiquity of cellular phones among
even the poor to bypass the slower formality of the Indian judiciary.45 Beyond
this ease of accessibility, Andhra Pradesh also mandates investigation by the
appropriate authorities within a mere week of a complaint's receipt.46 The
authorities can punish noncompliant lenders by canceling their registrations,47
which goes beyond civil fines by denying an MFI's right to operate. An MFI
visited Feb. 14, 2014) ("Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion-social capital-is critical for
poverty alleviation and sustainable human and economic development.").
40. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoffo A
Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1274 (1997) ("This attempt at distinguishing types
of groups thus provides no empirical support for our conjecture that groups have neutral effects on
performance because positive 'Putnam' forces are counterbalanced by negative 'Olson' influences.").
41. Feigenberg et al., supra note 32, at 1462.
42. Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Rules, supra note 19, rr. 24, 28, 29.
43. India Micro Finance Bill, supra note 20, cl. 25(2)(h)-(i).
44. Microfinance: Consumer Protection Guidebook, PHIL. NAT'L CREDIT COUNCIL I-
20 (2007), http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Microfinance-Consumer-Protection-Guidebook.pdf
(listing consumer protection provisions including substantive laws against deceptive and unfair
borrowing practices and procedural innovations like toll-free call centers for consumer complaints).
45. Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Rules, supra note 19, r. 28(1).
46. Id. r. 28(2).
47. Id. r. 10(1).
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has the right to an appeal before its registration is cancelled, but that right must
be exercised swiftly, preventing strategic delays by powerful lenders.48
These procedural innovations, however, are only pertinent because of the
underlying substantive rights they protect, particularly the right to be free from
the coercive debt collection practices of MFIs. The Andhra Pradesh rules not
only prohibit "coercive" methods, but they also require MFI CEOs to sign a
pledge that their MFI will not "deploy any agents for recovery." 49 In banning
the deployment of recovery agents, Andhra Pradesh limits MFIs to using only
those collection personnel reported at the time of MFI registration.50 This
prevents informal, ad hoc relationships with difficult-to-monitor recovery
agents from arising in the course of lending. By limiting the employment of
such agents and holding employers responsible for employee recovery
practices, Andhra Pradesh holds MFIs directly accountable if borrowers
experience stressful harassment at the hands of coercive collection agents.
These legal provisions therefore broadly combat the "lack of professionalism"
and lack of quality management within the sector, characteristics that can
imperil vulnerable borrowers.5 1
Beyond their theoretical appeal, these consumer protection provisions
have been practically enforced and have encouraged a needed change in lender
behavior. Initiatives to educate the police and media attention have spread
awareness and ensured enforcement in a country where the legal problems of
52
the poor are often ignored. In the first case under the Andhra Pradesh law that
resulted in arrests, the borrower alleged coercion based on the defendants' debt-
related intimidation, setting a public example of how the law criminalizes
illegitimate exertions of lender power.53 Politicians have pointed out the need
for such regulation to shape MFIs into "responsible lenders" and to end their
"strong-arm tactics." 54 While the exact contours of the law's "coercion"
definition continue to unfold, Andhra Pradesh's strong anti-harassment legal
provisions reflect the sort of streamlined "consumer grievance redressal
process" endorsed by microfinance experts55 to enhance consumer protection.
Other jurisdictions, however, do not comport with the Andhra Pradesh
model. Procedurally, some jurisdictions severely limit the enforcement ability
48. Id. r. 10(2).
49. Id. Form-2.
50. Id. r. 24.
51. Microfinance Banana Skins, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION 7 (2012),
http://www.citi.com/citi/microfinance/data/news120628.pdf.
52. See Police Arrests Staff of SKS & Spandana Microfinance Cos[.] on Harassment
Charge, ECON. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-10-22/news/27
623314_1_sks-microfinance-kumool-police-sks-spandana.
53. Id.
54. Microfinance Institutions Must Be Responsible Lenders: Rangarajan, HINDU, Aug.
29, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/microfinance-institutions-must-be-responsible
-lenders-rangarajan/article3836532.ece.





of MFI regulators: in Ghana, for example, bank liquidation requires a
56
pretermination petition to the High Court, an appellate body. Jurisdictions
such as Indonesia and Honduras spur vicarious institutional liability in favor of
employee liability for certain MFI regulatory violations, a practice that
diminishes institutional compliance and accountability. 57 Andhra Pradesh sits at
the frontier of microfinance consumer protection, in spite of, rather than
because of, its repayment frequency regulation.
V. Rethinking Repayment Frequency as a Regulatory Instrument
Repayment frequency should be used as a regulatory instrument in pursuit
of what it can accomplish, social capital formation, as opposed to what it
cannot, consumer protection. The main rationales articulated to justify less
frequent repayment are that it improves investment flexibility and reduces
stress on borrowers, yet these claims do not withstand careful scrutiny. First,
with regard to the flexibility to pursue illiquid investment, grace periods should
be the primary regulatory instrument. Second, with regard to borrower stress,
qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that social capital can actually
reduce stress.59 Therefore, the possibility of short-term financial stress should
not deter lawmakers from using repayment frequency to build stronger social
networks that reduce stress more broadly.
At the very least, emerging subnational, national, and supranational laws
of microfinance should not follow Andhra Pradesh's lead by banning the
weekly Grameen repayment schedule. More ambitiously, regulatory
frameworks could affirmatively encourage the development of social capital by
providing subsidized government lending at below-market interest rates to
MFIs contingent on their provision of group lending schemes with weekly
repayment schedules. Particularly where subsidized capital schemes are already
a part of, and will remain a part of, government lending policy, this could be an
effective deployment of public resources.60
While repayment and meeting are intertwined both in the classic Grameen
model and empirically in practice, these subsidies could also be provided
contingent on simply meeting more frequently, even when participants'
repayment schedules are not aligned. These subsidies would incentivize and
56. Regulatory Requirements for Microfinance, supra note 13, at 34.
57. See id.
58. Field et al., supra note 23, at 1.
59. Martin Gdichter, David A. Savage & Benno Torgler, The Relationship Between
Stress, Strain and Social Capital (Univ. of Innsbruck, Working Paper No. 4, 2010),
http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2010-04.pdf (using retrospective, multivariate
analysis to show that increased social capital correlates with lower individual stress).
60. In addition to India, Sri Lanka, for example, provides public and private subsidies
through both discounted capital and administrative support, Anura Atapattu, State ofMicrofinance in Sri
Lanka, INST. OF MICROFINANCE 54 (2009), http://www.inm.org.bd/publication/stateofmicro
/Sri%20Lanka.pdf.
267
Yale Journal on Regulation
encourage the positive externalities, such as deterring opportunistic default,61
that arise from social capital formation in microfinance.
VI. Conclusion
Repayment frequency-and particularly weekly repayment as in the
original Grameen model-constitutes a promising regulatory instrument to
build social capital. Recent laws have embraced lower repayment frequency
based on an incorrect presumption of repayment frequency's role in consumer
protection, which is better addressed by substantive anti-coercion rights and
procedural innovations to enforce them.
I do not advocate strict trans-jurisdictional harmony in the law of
microfinance repayment frequency. Much of the experimental evidence I have
drawn upon, for example, comes from politically stable regions.62 In conflict or
post-conflict regions where stress is already relatively high, the precise calculus
of balancing added financial stress against social capital gains may be
different.63 Moreover, group lending schemes traditionally allow for pre-
formed groups to join (rather than MFIs randomly assigning individuals to
groups), and if those groups reinforce preexisting ethnic or political divisions,
heightened repayment frequency might simply perpetuate intra-group
interaction rather than promote inter-group interaction.
There are crucial universal lessons from recent laws' underuse and misuse
of repayment frequency as a regulatory instrument in microfinance. Just as
microfinance's aims transcend narrow financial indicators, so must the metrics
against which we measure effective regulation in developing countries. A
commitment to protecting vulnerable borrowers requires laws that facilitate
interaction and community-building.
61. Orazio Attanasio et al., Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks, 4 AM.
ECON. J.: APPLIED EcON. 134, 135 (2012) ("We show that individuals prefer to group with close friends
and relatives with similar risk attitudes. When grouping with individuals outside their social network,
untrustworthy individuals are opportunistic, defaulting on risk-sharing arrangements when it pays to do
so and lying about their type, i.e., both their trustworthiness and their level of risk aversion, in order to
convince others to group with them.").
62. Many studies cited in this paper were conducted in partnership with the Village
Welfare Society's peri-urban and urban clients in India.
63. For a discussion ofpost-conflict microfinance, see Milford Bateman et al., Bosnia's
Microfinance Meltdown, AM. ECON. Ass'N. ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2012), http://www.microfinancegat
eway.org/gm/document- 1.9.56293/BosniaMeltdown.pdf.
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